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                            Abstract
      Feldstein (1977) questioned the classical proposition which
attributed to Ricard#(call the Ricardian Classical Proposition), that an
increase in the 2and rent tax 2owers the price of land by ･.e..b. e l'capitalized
                                                           tttttt..tt.tttttt.
value of the tax and thus the landowners bear the entire burden of the
tax, in an over}apping generations economy with fixed land but with
flexib2e supply ef capltal, whereas Calvo, Kotlikoff, and Rodriguez
(1979) pointed out that Feldstein's finding no longer remains valid in
the equivalent economy except that an intergenerational altruistic
bequest motive ls perfectly operative. The purpose of this paper is to
demonstrate that the counterargument of Calvo et al. Is not necessarily
valid desplte the presence of operative bequest motlve, if either a
selfish motive to leave bequest$, inheritance taxes, or property income
taxes is introduced into their model. The key reason for the failure of
the Ricardian Classical Proposition is the nonlinearity of either the
utility function with respect to the amount of bequests, or of the tax
rate with respect to the size of inheritances or property incorne.
1. Introduction
     In the semlna} paper of Feldstein (1977), he investigated tax
incidence on land rents in the Ufe-cycle mociei with a fixed iand which
is substitutable with capitai aRd labor. He obtained the "surprising"
result that with an irnposition of tax on iand rents, if land is
sufficientiy substitutable for productive capital, in the long-run a land
price goes up and thus the rental rate on capital falls substantially. He
therefore clairned that the Ricardian Classical Proposition (henceforth
RCP), that the ±and rent tax is unshlftable and thus landowners bear its
entire burden, is inappropriate in a dynamic economy where the supply of
capital is endogenously determined by a choice between consumption and
savxng.
     On the other hand, under the perfect foreslght assumption, Chamiey
and Write (1987) have developed the analysis by focuslng on the
transitlonal dynamic$ of Feldsteln's model. They showed that the land
rent tax may initialiy raise land values but there is aR upper bound of
      'one-half of tax revenues on the extent to which land values are rai$ed.
Their analysis is a dynamic complement to the coRventionai comparative
$tatics anaiysls of Feldsteln. Eaton (1988) used their anaiysis to
lnvestlgate the effects of an exogenous increase in forelgn investment on
natioRal welfare as weU as domestic capital accuraulation. I<ore recently,
Ihori (1990) extended it to a monetary economy.
     By contrast, Calvo, Kotiikoff, and Rodriguez (1979) (henceforth CKR)
reexamined Feldstein's proposition in Barro's bequest (or a single
                                        'dynastic} model where. an altrulstic bequest motive is perfectly
operative, and showed that a compensated land rent tax is not shifted at
ail and thus the tax is fully capitalized ln the prlce of land. As a
result, we once agaln are back to the Ricardian world despite the
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presence of a fXexible factor.
     There have been several extensions of F'eldstein's analysls, whereas
there are no further researches aiong the !ine of CKR's analysls despite
their apparent denlal of Feidstein's conciusions. Moreover, it seems
quite unrea!istic that life-cycle consumers leave Ro bequests to their
heirs, which was postulated by Feldstein as well as Chamley and Write, on
the grounds that bequests comrnonly take piace in real and probably
accouRt for a significant part of individual weaith [see, for example,
Kotlikoff and Suramers(1981)]. Such an observation and thelr theoretical
analysis may lead CKR to conclude that "both economic theory and
empirical evidence support David Ricardo's view of the incidence of a tax
on rent" (1979,p.874). If their statement is true, whether or not the
                      'landowners wili bear the 100 percent burden of the capitalized value of
the tax depends cruciaUy on whether or not an altruistic bequest motive
i$ stroitg enough to leave bequests; consequently, only the empirical
question as to a quantitat±ve assessment of such a bequest motive
remams.
     It is well-known that in the context of government debts policy,
Ricardian Equivalence, which says that a redistribution iR lump-sum taxes
accompanled by the issue of an equal amount of governmeRt bonds has no
effect on the iRtertemporal allocation of resources, fails to hold if
Barro's altruistic bequest model ls relaxed to allow one of the fo}lowing
ingredients, such as corner soiutions (because of weak inter-
generational a}truism) [Weil (1987)], imperfect capltal markets (or the
borrowing ¢onstraints) [ffubbard and Judd (1986)], uncertaln future income
[Feldstein(1988)], endogenous fertility decisions IBarro and Becker
(1989)], or the presence of dlstortionary taxation [Barsky, Mankiw, anci
Zeldes(1986) and Abel(1986)]. In the llght of these considerations we
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shall reexamlne CKR's analysis, which ls based on Barro's altrulstic
bequest rnodei, ln more realistic situations. .
     The purpose of this paper is to accomplish this task. In doing so,
we shall maintain the foilowing two assumptions made by CKR. First, the
revenue from the land rent tax is refunded in a lump-sum fashion to
taxpayers period by period (called a compensated tax).i since such a
compensated tax leaves the consumer's budget constraint unchaRged (i.e.,
no income effects), we can coRcentrate exciusively on the intertemporal
relative price effects (or the effects on the intergenerational terms of
trade) of the tax, whlch have not been addressed by Feldstein, as well as
Chamley and Write, SiRce in their models the tax would affect an ecenomy
mainly through incorne effects rather than substitutlon effects, it
generates neither distortions nor deadweight loss. This is solely because
their analysls is based on a saving function, wh!ch Tfiakes it lmposslble
to separate out the substitution effegt,from the tax induced impacts on
savlng behavior; instead, we shall analyze directly the I£uler equation
for consumption derived from individual's intertemporal decisions, which
serves to sharpen analytical results. Second, there are aiways positive
bequests motivated by intergenerational altruism as in the Bar.ro-type
overiapping generations model, thereby ruling out the possibi±Xy of
comer solutions. If allowing corner solutions (i.e., Ro bequests are
left to heirs), there is no qualitative differeRce between CKR's and
Feldstein's models so that the RCP necessarily fails. Therefore, the
proper question to be considered is that even if an altruistic bequest
motive is perfectly operative, under what circumstances the RCP may fail.
In additlen, these two assumptions together would serve not only to keep
our model paraliellRg CKR's so as to examine the robustness of CKR's
results, but aiso to confine our analysis to the foHowing three
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extensions rather than all posslbilities appeared in the literature of
government debt policy.
     The first modification is to iBtroduce impure aXruism into the
modei (Section 3). PareRts would experience a warm glow from maklng
bequests to their children [e.g.,Andreoni (1989)]. The parents may also
feel obiigation to leave bequests due to family heirlooms, custom, or
social status; aiternatively, the risk averse parents may prefer to hold
positive bequests (or life-cycle saving) in order to avoid the depletion
of their weaith at too early an age [called accidental bequests, see Abel
(1985)]. Recently Bernheim et al.(1985) have suggested that parents may
strategically use bequests either to control their chiidren or to receive
more attention services provided by them. These causal observations and
deeper theoretical consideratioRs would indicate that such seemingly
selfish bequest motives are quite common in a real world. To incorporate
those motives into the model and to 4vgid unnecessary complications, we
assume simply that the parent's utility function depeRds directly on the
size of bequests in addition to the lteir's utility function. It is shown
that the RCP fails to hold despite the presence of perfectly operative
                              'altruistic bequests, when utility is non2inear with respect to the size
of bequests.
     The second is to introduce a nonlinear bequest tax (it may be calied
either an inheritance, estate, or ;vealth tax) (Section 4). Most developed
countries have a progressive tax on bequests. The presence of such a tax
invalidates the RCP because owing to the nonlinearity of the tax rate
with respect to the size of bequests, changes in the land rent tax will
affect the price of heir's consumption 2n terms of the price of parents'
current consumptlon through changes in the marginal tax rate of bequests,
thereby distorting the Euler condition. For the simliar reason, the RCP
4
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fails in the presence of a non2inear property incoll?e tax as weil, whiie
the long-run price of land may fall or rise depending on whether or not
the marginal tax rate of property income may rise with the tax (SectioR
5).
     In Section 2, as a prerequisite and for coraparison purposes, the
basic model is presented, which is a simplified version of CKR's model.
The plans and results of Section 3, 4, and 5 have been already stated.
Section 5 gives brief concluding remarks and poss±ble exteRsions.
Mathematical details are found in appendlxes.
2.The Basic model
     Consider techRology which requires land, labor, and capital to
produce output which can be used for either consumption or capital. This
techitology is represented by a time-invariant, twice-differentiable
production function, Yt:F(Kt,Nt,Lt), which exhibits posit2ve aRd
diminishing marglnal products with respect to each iRput, l.El}Et6Fi=O and
lirvLF.=co (ixxK,N,L), and constanVreturns to scale, where Y ls output, Ki-)o    1
cap±tal, N labor, L land, and Fi the partiai derivative with respect to
the corresponding argument i, respectively. In intensive form it can be
expressed by
       yt=F(Kt/Nt,1,Lt/Nt)=f(kt,lt), (1)
where yg!Y/2V, k=-K/N, aRd 1=L/N. We assume that the supplies of labor and
                                                                 2land are both fixed over time and moreover that N =L ut1 for all t.                            't                                 t
     Assuming a competitive setting and that capital does not depreciate,
the real wage wt, the real rate of return on capfutal rt, and the real
rate of rent on land mt, respectively, are given by
      rt= r(kt)=fk(kt,D, (2a)
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       wt-- w{kt) = f{kt,1) - ktfk(kt,1} - fl(kt,D, (2b)
       mt-- m(kt)=f!(kt,1), (2c)
where f. (j--k,1) represents the partial derivative with respect to the        j
corresponding argument. Note also that r'<O, but the signs of ;v' (=
-kfkkhflk) and M'(=flk) are ambiguous in general. For analyticai
coRvenience, we assume that fk2 is positive G.e., capital and iand are
complementary) but not very large, so their signs are both positive.3
     Given perfect foresight without uncertainty, capital and land are
                                                              'perfect portfolio substitutes, and heRce the return to hoiding oRe unit
of land must equal the return to holdlng one unit of capitai:
                   "-e)Mt.1 + Pt+1
                           t
where Pt is the price of land iR period t and e is the tax rate on pure
land rent.
     Ilach consumer lives for only one period.4 Thank to the assumptien of
constaBt population, each consumer has one child, and this child is only
his heir. A representative generation t consumer derives utility from his
own consumptlon ct and from the weifare of his heir ;vr+1. H s preference
is expressed by the additively separable utUity function:
with u'>O, u"<O, limu'(c)=O, and llrau'(c)=co, where BE(O,1) is the                                      c-)ocee
                                                       5constant weight assigned to the utility of the heir. He supplies oRe
unit of labor inelasticaily in exchange for receiving a wage ;vt, receives
lnheritances bt from the previou$ generatSon and lump-sum transfer$ zt
from the government, and earns property income accrued to bt. He
allocates aH of his avaUable resources between consumptlon and
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altruistic bequests. Thus his flow budget constraint is
        ct+bt.1=(1+rt)bt+wt+zt. (s)
     The generatlon t consumer with perfect foreslght ma><imizes his
intertemporal utility function (4) subject to (5) and a glven amount of
inheritances bt. Since bequests are the only form of savings in this
economy, the bequest motive is always operating for ali periods
                     6(±.e.,bt>O for al! t). Thus the above decision problem for generation t
will be equivaient to maximizing akruistic infinite-horizon dynasty's
welfare subject to the corresponding infinite-horizon budget coBstraint,
because generation t is Unked to all future descendaRts through positive
bequests. Lettlng At be the Lagrangian shadow price of (5), we have the
following first-order necessary conditions for ail t:
        SAt.i(i+rt.P=At･ (6b)
In addition, optimality imposes the foHowing transversality coRdition:
             t
        t->cp
     The asset market clearing coRdition is
We assume that the government rebates the tax revenue from land rent
taxes iR a lump-sum way to the consumer period by period:
         tt
Substituting (8) and (9) 2nto (5) and making use of (2a)-(2c), we get the
goods market ciearlng conditioR:
       f(kt,D-kt.1+ kt- ct=O. (lo)
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     SubstitutiRg (6a) into {6b), we obtain the dynawics of c, k, and P
for all t which are characterized by (3), (10), and
        Bu'(ct.1)[1÷rt."=u'(ct), (11)
together vgith the transversality conditlon (7). (11) implies that at the
optimurn the consumer equates the utihty from consumlng an extra uRit in
period t wlth the utility from beclueathing an extra unit, thus increasing
his hetr's consuraption by 8[1+rt.ll units in period t+1.
                                                   *x     In the stationary equilibrium, setting ctmect+1=c , kt=Ict+1=k and Pt"
       x    = P for all t yleldsP t+1
               +
                        *        .(k'E) ., (1-e):(k), (12b)
                    P
           x*
Xt is easy to prove the following proposition (the proof is found in
appendix A):
Proposition 1: There is a unique stationary equilibrium, ;vhich is saddle-
point stab2e in the locally linearized system of (3), (10), and (11).
      Furthermore, from "2a)-(12c) it is straightforward to show that
           ee        dk
        de
          -k X        dP m
               ue r
        dde(i-e)M =-m+ <o. (i3c)
These results coirtcide with those of CKR (1979); namely, the land rent
tax has no impact on the loRg-run capital stock and is fully capitalized
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in the price of land, so that the RCP holds. This is mainiy because (12a)
solely determines the stationary-state capitai stock, being independent
of changes in either P or e. In words, since the long-run supply curve of
capital is infinitely elastic (or horizontal) with respect to the
                       -1                         -1 and the long-run demaRd curve of capital isinterest rate at rate B
given by f'(k), the intersection of both curves, which determines the
long-run capttal stock, ls invarlant to changes ln P or e. Thus the
interest rate and the gross rent on land both remain unchanged as a
consequence of the fixed capital stock in conjunction with the fixed
supplies of land aRd labor.7 Hence, the after-tax reRt on land, (1-e)m,
has to fal} immediately just by the tax, so does the price of land by
exactly the ful! capitalization of the tax so as to keep equiiibrium in
the no-arbltrage condition (12b). Consequently, capltai, eonsumption, and
the welfare of all succeedlng generatlons are unaffected in the ioRg run,
while the only initial landlords b.ear the entire burden of the tax
resulting from the fall in the iand price7 To sum up:
Proposition 2: tVhen the economy is initia12y in a stationary equi2ibrium,
an increase in the land rent tax affects neither the capital stock nor
consumption but causes the price of land to immediate2y J'ump to its new
stationary-state 1eve1.
     Two important remarks are stated. CKR have assumed the recursive
utillty functlon Wtxu(ct,Wt+1), unlike the present model with the
constant lntercohort discount factor. With this preference, the modified
golden-rule condition (12a) wiil be amended to
        6W           t"1[1+r(kX}]=1, (14)        aWt
           M ･X ptwhere IUt"u(c, blt+1(c, Wt+1(c, '''))). Accordingly, the coRstant parameter
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S in (12a) ls replaced by thG marginal rate of substitution between the
utUitie$ of two succeeding generations, which gives an eiastic iong-run
supply curve of capital [see Epstein and Hynes (1983)]. Although this
intergenerational }(RS depends on the entire path of future consumptlon,
                                                                  eein the statlonary state lt depends oniy on the constant path of c and
              +thus that of k through (12c). This implies that (14) can be solved for
                      *the constant path of k in a recursive manner independently of the rest
of the system. As a result, the stationary-state captta± stock stiH
remains unaffected in response to changes in the price of laRd and/or the
Land rent tax. Therefore, the lnflnitely elastic supp}y curve of capital
is neither sufficient nor necessary to establish the RCP ("not
sufficiency" will be proven later). Second, accordlng to CKR, the full
capitaUzation of the compensated land rent tax continues to hold for
ecoltomies which have net yet converged to a statlonary state. It is easy
to show that this is true of our.basic modei aiso. ;"hen there is
initlaUy no tax, the .price of land is determined according to Pt=
Zl.o(i+rt+i)-imt+i･ suppose now that when the iand rent tax e is
introduced, the paths of kt and ct reraain unchanged and the after-tax
price of land ls given by Pt-- £`l.'.o(1+rt.P-10-e)mt.i. It is immediately
seen that the dynamic equations (10) and (11) are unchaltged, so does (3)
by substitution of the after-tax land price fSt instead of P. Thus these
paths are solutions of the dynamics system (3), (10), and (12) in the
presence of e, implying that the RCP holds along the transitioR path
as well.
     Chamiey and Write (1987) have shown that in the overlapping
generations model wlthout intergenerational bequests, an uncompensated
increase in the land rent tax Rot only iowers the price of land
iramediately but aiso induces accumulatlon of capital. The two reasons of
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this difference can be identifled. The first is that the lifetime saving
in their modei is not infinitely elastic wlth respect to the interest
rate even 2n the stationary state, due to the absence of an altruistic
bequest motive. The second is that, instead of the goiden-rule conditlon
such as (12a), in their modei the long-run capital stock is determined by
the asset market equilibrium condition whose demand side contains the
price of land. Since the lower price of land caused by the higher iaRd
reRt tax implies simply a reduction in the demand for assets, with the
upward-s2oping (i.e., finite elastic) supply curve of saving the lnterest
rate has to be decreased so as to clear this market. This fal) in turn
stimulates capital accumulation.
3. Medification introduced by impure altruism
     As mentloned ln the introduction, we assume that the amount of
bequests directly enters the parents' utiHty function as a separate
argument, in addition to the heir's utility as well as his own
consumpt2on. For analytical convenience, a generation t consumer is
assumed to maximize the additiveiy separable utnity function:8
        Lv't = u(ct) + v(bt.1) + B;,Xt.1, (15)
subject to (5) and a given amount of bt, where v(bt+1) represents the
                              to the heir, with v'>O, v"<O, limv'(b)=O,utility from bequeathing b                          t+1                                           b->oo
and 1imv'(b)=co.    bbO
     Solving the infinite horizon optiraization problem associated with
C15) in the same way as in the previous sect!on yieids the following
first-order conditlons for aH t:
       Bu'(ct.i)[i+rt.i(kt.i)]+v'(kt.i+Pt.i)=u'(ct), (i6)
which states that the consumer equates the utility from consuming an
extra unit in perlod t with the sum of the utility from bequeathing an
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extra unit, which increases his heir's censttmption by B[1+rt+1] unXs in
period t+1, and the utllity frorn enjoying "warm giow".
     In the stationary equilibrium, we have (12b), (12c), and
     '
               es x"e, ",F   B[1+r(k ]]+[v'(k +P )/u'(c )]=1. (17)
As ¢an be seeR from (17), the land rent tax can affect the
stationary-state capitai stock through changes in P. The stationary-state
effects of the land rent tax are given by
           x                  -1 *dk         de "IDI              mv" >O, (18a)
           pt         ddPe =IDI-1{v"+Bu'r'+u"r"[s"+r')-1]}(-mue)lo, (lsb)
                s ee    d(1-e)m x                    dk                  = -m + (1-e)mt                                  dedO
                  = mX{-1 + IDIMI(1-e)m' v"} i o, (18c)
where aH variabies are evaluated at their stationary-state values and
lDlaxr {v"+Bu'r'+u"r [B(1+r )-1]}-v"{P r'-(1-e)m'}. As shown in appendix
B, the negative sign of IDI is a sufficient (and Recessary) conditlon for
the stationary equllibrlum to be a saddlepoint. On the other hand, if
IDI>O, the stationary equilibrium is completely urtstable (called a
source), whlle if IDI :O, the path is "stable" in the sense that it stays
at the initial point; however, the impMcit function theorem fails at the
stationary equUibrium because it is non-hyperbolic. Therefore, it is
reasonabie to assume that IDI<O in order to perform economically
meanlngful comparative statlcs analysls. Putting different}y, because all
the roots canitot be le$s than unity ln modulus, the system never has the
case of price indeterminacy and thus the only structure of a saddlepoint
can be cofnpatib±e wkh the assumption of perfect foresight. This stands
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in a sharp contrast to the mode} of Chamiey and Write (1987) in whlch the
lndeterminacy of price may well arise.
     Furthermore, the impact of the iand rent tax on the long-run capital
stock is positive lf and only if the stationary equiMbrium ls
saddlepoint stable. By contrast, in the model of Chamley and Write the
assumption of saddlepoint stabiilty does not suffice to determlne the
long-ruR effect on capital. Instead, they have assumed the so-called
Hicks2an stability condition in that the slope of the demand curve is
less than that of the supply curve in the asset marketP On the other
hand, it ls seen from (18b) and (18c) that the effects on the price of
iand and the after-tax return on land are still ambiguous in our model.
In order to sign these effects, we have to strengthen the saddlepoint
                                                        *xstable conditlon by assuming that v"+l3Lt'r'+u"r[B(1+r)-1]<O;
                          x eeconsequeitUy, we have dP/de<O and d(1-e)m/de<O. Our strengthened
assumption ls quite simUar to the HicksiaR stability coRdition used by
the authors above ln the sense that our assumptioR can be depicted as a
situation where the long-run suppiy curve of capital, B-1-1-B-1(v'/u'),
be less steeper than the iong-run demand curve of capital, f'(･k), as
shewn in figure 1. Moreover, by comparing (13b) and (18b) one can see
that the negative effect of the tax on the price of land is smailer in
absolute value than the fuH capitalization of the tax, because a higher
capltal stock reduces the interest rate at which land rents are
capitalized, thus offsetting the full capitalization effect to sorne
exteRt. Hence the initial landowners do not bear the full burdeR of the             '
present vaLue of aH of the tax revenue. Part of the tax is shifted from
land to capital in the long run.
    On the other hand, changes in the land rent tax has two immediate
lmpacts on the prlce of land througlt changes ln the after-tax rent on
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land and through changes in the future price of land (see (3)]. The
former effect is negative at aR instantaneous moment (recall that capltal
and thus the gross rent on land are fixed instantaneousiy), while the
latter effect hinges on the entire patlL of iand prices and heRce largeiy
on the long-run effect oR the price of land. Slnce under our strengthened
assumption in the long run the !and price falls in response to the
increase in the iand rent tax, so does it immediately [see (C4) in
appendix C]. Since this faH is simpiy a reductioR in the size of
bequests, the marginal utility of bequests, v'(k+P), is increased,
thereby eRhaRcing an incentive of the current generatioR to bequeath to
their heirs. As a result, current consumption also falls immed2ateiy [see
(C3) in appendix C], thus causing capital accurnulatSon to begin. The
resulting hlgher capital stock in turn iRduces the gross land rent to
rise but the interest rate to fall. Accordingly, the price of land is
rising through tlme, but in the new stationary equiiibrlum it has to be
lower than in the old one; if it were back to the origiRal levei, under
our strengthened assumption the opportunity cost of holding capital,
B-1-1-B-1(v'/u'), is higher than the return on capital as a result of the
higher capital stock (see figure 1). To restore equilibrium in the
long-run capital market (i.e., to satisfy the equallty of (17)], the
price of land has to be decreased, leading to a reduction in the
opportunity cost and thus shifting the long-run supply curve downward as
depicted in figure 1.
Proposition 3: A stationary equilibrium is saddlepoint stable and an
increase in the land rent tax raises the long-run capital stock if and
         ･* se ge rkonly if r {v"+Bu'r'+u"r [B(1+r )-ll}-v"{P r'-(1-e)m'}<O. Furthermore,
both the price of land and the after-tax rate of return on land faU in
                                       *kthe long rttn if and only if v"+Stt'rf+u"r [B(1+r )-1]<0.
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     However, Feidstein (1977) also poirtted out the possibility that the
price of land and the after-tax rent on laltd may rise ln the long run, if
the elasticity of substitution between cap2ta2 and land is sufficiently
iow, and/or if the elasticity of saving with respect to the interest rate
is negatively iarge. In contrast, under the saddlepoint stability
condition, the long-run land price rises in our model if and only if
             xxv"+Btt'r'+ u"r [B(1+r )-1]>O, or equivalently, using (17)
                    x xx         v"--Bu'r'+(-c u"/u')(r /c )v'>O; C19)
namely, the long--run supply curve of capitai is steeper than the iong-run
demand curve of capital, as shown in figure 2. 0bservation of (19)
reveals that the higher the elasticity of marginal utility with respect
to consurnption, -cu"/u', tl!e smaller the initia2 capital stock, and/or
the higher the marginal utility of bequests, the more iikely (19) is
satisfied. A rlse in land prices is more likely to occur in, for
example, economies with small capi'tal stocks such as developing
countries. Note, however, that the larger the magnitude of (19), the more
likely will be the system completely unstable, so that (19) has to be
bounded above to meet the saddlepolnt stability conditlon.
     WheR the long-ruR land prlce rises, the immediate impact on the
prlce of laRd is quaiitatively ambiguous [see (C5) in appendix C]. If
this impact is negative, the same argumeRt as in proposition 3 ¢an be
applied, except that the long-run price of land in the new ecluilibrium is
higher than in the oid equilibrium. On the other hand, if the price of
land rises iramediately, the marginai utUity of bequests is decreaseci,
thus discouraging an incentive to bequeath. Nevertheless, consuraptlon
falls immediately, thus causing accumulation of capitai. The reason can
be explalned as follows; both the lncreased Iand rent tax aRd the higher
iand price reduce the after-tax rent on land instantaneousiy, thus
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inducing the consumer to substitute land for capltal; since the desired
level of bequests is smaller, pesitive capital accumulation can occur
only through the faU in consumpUon. IR the long run, the higher price
of land is consistent with more accumulation of capital regardless of
whether the initial impact on land prices is positlve or negative. If the
price of land were unchanged, under (19) the opportuRity cost of holding
capital is lower than the return on capltal due to the increased capital
stock (see figure 2). To restore equilibrium in the long-run capital
market the price of land has to be increased, causing a upward shift in
the long-run supply curve of capital as andicated in figure 2.
     It shouid be stressed that the mere presence of impure altruism is
Rot sufficient to destroy the RCP. Indeed, if the utility function of
bequests is Mnear, that is, v"=O, (18) reduces to (13) and thus we again
get the RCP. However, lf it is nonlinear, the marginal utility of
bequests varies according to changes in the price of laRd. Such
variations would violate the equity of (17), thereby affecting the
stationary-state capital stock.
4. Modi£kcation introduced by nonlinear inheritance taxes
     Consider the case where an inheritance (bequest or estate) tax T is
levied oR the bequest b. Assume that it is nonliRear with respect to the
leve! of bequests, and moreover that its marginal tax rate is non-
negative, less thaR one and is nondecreasirig in b (i.e.,OsT'<1 and T")O).
Then the flow budget constraint of generation t will be replaced with
                                           i       ct + bt+1 = (1+rt){bt-T(bt)} + tvt + zt,
where zl=-emt+(1+rt)T(bt)･
     As before, we obtalR the foHowing first-order conditlons:
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        f3u'(ct.1)(1+rt.1){1-T'(bt.1)} :u'(ct). (20)
     In the stationary equillbrium, we have (12b), (12c), and
             x ee        B(1+r ){1-'c'(b )}=1. (21)
The stationary-state effects of the land rent tax are given by
           x         ddke =iQl-1{-q+r*)T"inge}>o, (22a)
           M         g(ll =lq-i{rta-v)-a+r')T"}(-m"}<o,                                                                 (22b)
               *         ggl-e)m .-.'{1+lq-1(1-e)m'(1+r')T"}<O,                                                                 (22c)
                        +xxxwhere IQI!{r'(1-T')-(1+r )T"}r +(1+r )T"{P r'-(1-e)m'}<O. It should be
noted that the stationary equilibrlum is a saddlepolnt without further
restrictions (see appendix I)). Therefore, in the long run the capital
stock rises; moreover, the price of land unambiguously falls by a lesser
amount of the full capitalization of the tax; and the after-tax rent on
land unambiguously faHs less by the tax.
     The intuition behirtd these results is straightforward. Suppose that
the economy is initially ln a stationary equilibrium. By applying the
same argument as in appendix C, it can be demonstrated that an increase
in the laRd rent tax causes an immediate faH in the price of land. This
fall and hence a reduction in bequests will decrease the marginal tax
rate (recall that T"atO), thereby lowering the pri¢e of the heir's
consumption relative to that of the parents' osm consumptlon and thus
encouraging an incentive to bequeath. As a resuk, current consumptlon
falls immediateiy and thus positive capital accumulation takes place. The
prfuce of land is rising through time as capital is accumulating.
Nevertheless, the price of laitd in the new stationary equilibrium is
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lower than ln the initial equilibrium, because as a consequence of the
higher capital stock the marginal after-tax return on capitai,
r(1-T')-T'r, is iower than the opportunity cost of holding capital, B-1-1
(see figure 3); to restore the equality of (21) the price of laRd has to
be lower than the original level. The resulting lower price of land
shlfts the long-run supply curve of capital upward as shown ln figure 3.
     However, when the tax rate is linear (T"=O), its margtnal tax rate
remaiRs the same in response to changes in P, thereby leaving (21)
unaffected; heRce, (22) reduces to (13). As ln the previous section, thls
implies that the failure of the RCP is due not only to the presence of
the inheritance tax rate in the modified golden-rule coRdition (21), but
also to the noniinearity of the tax rate with respect to the size of
bequests.
5. Modification introduced by noniinear property income taxes
     Consider the case where a property income tax T is levied on
property iRcome accruing to the bequest b. Assume that the tax rate ls
nonlinear with respect to the size of property income, and that OsT'<1
and T")O. With this tax, the flow budget constraint of generation t
becomes
       ct + bt.1 m (1+rt)bt- T(rtbt) + ;vt + ze, (23)
where z9!iemt+T(rtbt). Similarly, we obtain the following first-order
condition:
       Bu' (ct.1)[1+{1-'r' (rt.lbt.1)}rt.ll = u' (ct). (24)
     In the stationary equilibrium, we have (12b), {12c), and
            x x-e       i3{1+r {1-T'(rb)}l =1. (25)
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The stationary-state effects of the land rent tax are given by
           M         gli .tRl-i{-(r'")2T"m""}>o, (26a)
           ,sc         gg .IRI-1{r,"-T,)-rXTn(r"+b"r')}(-n?')to, (26b}
                x         ggi-e)m .-m'{i+IRE-i(i-e)mtr"-r"} ll o, (26c)
provided IRI!{r'(1-T')-r"T"(rX+b"r')}rX+(r")2T"{P"r'-(1-e)m'}<o. Although
it appears that the modified golden-ruie condition (2S) is quite similar
to {21), its dynamics is slightly more complicated; that is, the
stationary equilibrium is a saddlepoint if IRI<O; no linearized path
converges to the stationary equillbrium otherwise (the proof can be done
in an analogous way as in appendix B). Moreover, uRder the saddlepoint
stabfulity condition, an increase in the property income tax unambiguously
raise$ the long-run capital stock, but has ambiguous effects oR the land
price as well as the net rate of reRt on land in the long run. These
effects hinge on the relative siope of the long-run supply and demand
curves of capital, as in section 3.
     If we strengthen the saddlepoint stabHity condition by assuming
               " xxthat r'(lt')-r T"(r +b r')<O (i.e.,the long-run demand curve of capital
                                                             xis steeper than the supply curve as shown in figure 4), dP /de<O and
       ued(1-e)m /de<O. These long-run effects can be explained in a similar way
                                                                 xxas in the case of inheritance taxes. By contrast, if r'(1-T')-r r"(r
  *+b r')>O (i.e., the loRg-run demand curve of capital is less steeper than
the supply curve as shown in figure 5), the land price rises in the long
run, and thus the initial impact on the price of land is uncertain;
hence, we have to consider the two cases separately, as in section 3.
     Finally, three remarks are iR order. Flrst, when the property income
tax rate is l2near {i.e.,T"=e), the RCP will emerge once again; hence,
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whether the RCP may or may not hold rests oR whether the tax rate on
property income is linear or nonUnear, as in the case of lnheritance
taxes. SecoRd, since the tax payment depends on the iRterest rate as well
as the size of bequests, so does the marginai tax rate. These arguments
move in opposlte dlrections to changes in the }eve! of capital, thus
resuiting in the ambiguous effect on the margiRal tax rate. Thls
ambiguity creates several possibilities of the dynafnics as well as
comparative statics, unlike the case of inheritaRce taxes. Third, lt ls
not necessarily true that the presence of any type of nonlinear taxes
alway$ undermines the RCP. To see this, coBsider, for lnstance, the case
of a labor incorne tax. In this case, the RCP continues to held regardless
of whether the labor income tax is llnear or noRlinear. Indeed one can                                                              '
see that nelther the tax function nor the land price appears in the Euler
conditioR (24) or (25)30 In other words, these variables emerge in the
Euler condition only if the tax fuRct;o;! depends non2inearly on the size
               'of bequests.
6. Concluding Remarks
     We have demonstrated that even if aR altruistic bequest motive is
perfectly operative, the RCP ceases to be valid provided that either
impure altruism utillty or a RonMRear tax on inheritances or on property
income is introduced. These findings iRdicates that the existence of a
nonlinear fun¢tion that depends directly on the size of bequests is
cruciai to lead the faUure of the RCP. Therefore, with such
noniinearities the changes in the price of land resitlting from changes in
the land rent tax can affect the Euler condition determining the
intergenerational terms of trade. Under fairly general condltions
together with the assumption of sadcilepoint stability, mereover, a higher
rate of land rent taxes would promete capital accumulation and thus
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improve the $ocial weifare of succeeding geRerations, regardless of
whether the lon.cr-run 2and price may or may not rise. The reasoning ls
that since our modified golden-rule stationary equilibrium is dynamica12y
efficient, any tax reform toward operatioRs･ that induce capStal
accumulation leads to higher social welfare. Consequently, the succeeding
generatioRs are aiways benefited from the introduction of lapd rent
taxes, while the landowners (i.e., the initial generation) gain only when
the initial price of land goes up but their welfare falls otherwise
(recal± that the reduction in their iRcome resulting from the tax
increase ls compeRsated by lump-sum transfers).
     The most natural extension is to introduce an altruistic gift motive
in which consumers derive utility from raising the utUity of parents as
well as from their owR consumption, and thus are motlvated to give
resources to their parents. However, it should be clear that the
arguments established for operative bequests wUl ho!d symmetrically for
operative gifts, although the sole presence of a gift motive does not
suffice to invalidate the RCP. It is straightforward to show that the
failure of the RCP occurs only if the foliowlng two conditions are
satisfied sirnukaneously: (1) a gift motive toward parents is impure in
the sense that the heirs enjoy the utHity from the act of giving itself:
(ii) the utllity of heirs is nonlinear with respect to the size of gifts.
The second extension ls to introduce heterogeneous consumers.
Keterogeneity of consumers may be defined with respect to preferences,
discount factors, ini'tial holdlngs of yiealth, or labor income. The
unequal distribution of the tax burden amoRg such consumers may be
generated by different tax payments proportional to different size of
land hoidings, unless the resulting negatlve income effects are canceled
out by lump-sum transfers. However, so long as the consumers are assumed
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to be at an interior solution with respect to either bequests or gifts,
such redistrSbution has no effect on the intergenerationai aUocatioR of
resources. This is because the redistributed incorne effects sgili be
neutralized by offsetting changes in the size of bequests or of gifts, so
that the consu.mptkon level of each consumer remains unchanged. However,
if there are some consumers who leave neither bequests nor gifts because
of, for instance, insufficient labor income or insufflcient initial
wealth, the RCP no longer be valid. The third extension is to introduce
human ¢apital investment as akernative form of bequests, in addition to
nonhuman bequests (i.e.,physical capital and laRd). Kowever, even though
this extension adds another choice variable to the model lt would not                                                        '
alter our conciusion since the Euler coRdition still remains the sameli
     The main message from the present paper is that even if the
possibility of corner selutions is Rot allowed (or even if
intergenerational altruism is strong enough), CKR's conciusion (i.e., the
RCP) would be extreme on theoretica! grounds as well.
Appendlx A
     Using the Inada conditions imposed on the production functlon and
from (12a), it is easy to show that there is a unique stationary-state
capital stock, that is, a unique stationary equilibrium.
     To ascertain that the statlonary equilibrium is saddlepoint stable,
we take a linear approximation of (3), (10), and (11) around the
                        -k *XstatioRary equHibrium (c , k , P ):
        Bu"(1+r) Bu'r' O Ct+1-C                     x se     O -{Pr-(Fe)m'}1 k-k =                                      t+1
                                               x                                        P -P                                         t+1   L
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                                                    x                        utt o O c-c                             t                                        sc *                        o11+r kt-k. CAI)                       -1 1+ree C iPt--P"
We shall calculate the product of the foHowlng two matrices:
                                          -1                  '            Bu"(1+r) Bu'r' O u" O O
   Wl]i O -<Pr-(1-e)m'}1 O 1 1+r
                                                        *              o 1 o -1 1+ro
            {Bu"(1+r")}-1(u"+f3u'r') -utrt(u't)-1 e
                                            x
              -{Pr'-(1-e)m'} {Pr'-(1-e)m'}(1+r}1+r
      The characteristic equatioR of the matrix [jl] is:
   Fl(pt) '- pt3 - {(u")-1(u"+Bu'r')+2(1+r')}g2 +
                {2B-1+u'r'(u")-1+Q+rX)2}pt-B-1"+rX)=o, (A2)
                * -1                  ) =1.noting that B(1+r
                                                                     *     As can be checked by straightforward substitution, a root is 1+r .
                                            xFl(it) may then be divided by the factor p-(1+r ), and so
                      x       }rl(si)={ia-(1+r )}G(i2), (A3)
where G(l.t)iiii.L2-{(u")-1(tt"+Bu'r')+(1+rX)}s.t+B-? The discrimlnant of G(i.t) is
given by
       D :{(u")-IBu'r'+r"}2 + 4Bu'r'(u")rmi >o,
which impMes that the two roots of G(g) are real. Using the relationship
between the roots and coefficients of G(pt), and Ietting lts roots as p                                                                      1
and pt2, we have
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        yl " u2 = (u")-1(u"+Bu'r') + (1-÷-r") > o,
                -1        gli-t2=B >O.
These facts lmply that the two roots are posltive. Moreover, because
        G(1) = (1-pt1)(1-p2) = - (u")MIBu'r'<o,
ene root is greater than un±ty, while the other is less than unlty.
     To surn up, ail the three roots are real and positive; moreover, the
two roots are greater than unity aRd the remaining root is less than
unity. Therefore, the stationary ecluilibrium is a saddlepoint.
AppeRdix B
     Proceeding in the same way as in appendix A, we have the foilowing
linear approximation of (3), (10), and (16) around the stationary
             x pt *equUibrium (c, k, P ):
                   xx     Ct+1- C Cth' C                   *xkt.1-k =[J2] kt-k, (Bl)                   *x    Pt.1- P Pt- P
where
         {Bu"(1+rue)}-1(u"+Bu'r'+v")
                 -1 [J2]i -{p*r'-(i-e)m'}
             -{Bu"(1+rwa)}-1(su'r'+v")(1+rX) -{i3u"(1+rX)}-lv"
                            x                         1+r O.                    -k -X f          {P r'-(1-e)m'}(1+r ) 1+r
     The characteristic equation of the matrix [J2] is
  F2(s2) = i.L3 - [{g3u"(1+r')}Ml(u"+Bu'r'+v")+2a+r*)]s.L21+[2i3Ml+ u,rt(u")-1+
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  tt+r")2+ {Bu"a+r"E)}-iv"{-p"r'+(i-e)m'+(i+r"F)}]iL - B-i(i+r"") = o. (B2)
Since the determinant of [J2], which equals Bww1(1+r"), is positive, there
are either one or three positive roots. Furthermore, since it is easily
checked that
 F2(1)={Bu"(1+r")}M1[{v"+Bu'r'+u"rX[B(1+r")-1]}rX-v"{p"r'-(1-e)m'}]>o,
                   ee x ee x (BA-)      if {v"+Bu'r'+r u"[B(2+r )-1]}r -v"{P r'-(1-e)m'}<O,
 F2(s.t)<O for any ii<O, (B5)
there is at ieast one real roet in the interval (O,1), provided that {v"+
         **+ veBu'r'+u"r [B(1+r )-1]}r -v"{P r'-(1-e)m'}<O. Assuming this condition, we
further suppose that the remaining two roots are real and positive [note
that when the two roots are real, they have to be positive because of
(B5)]. In this case, at least one of･the remaining two roots must exceed
unity, because the product of all three roots [i.e.,B-1(1+r*)] is gr ater
than untry. Moreover, the other root caRnot be less than unity also,
because lf this were a case, F2(1) must be negative, which contradicts
(B4). Thus, the remaining two roots have to be greater than unity. If the
remainiRg two roots are complex conjugates, the deterrainant equals the
product of the positive real root and the square of the modulus of the
complex conjugate roots. Since the determinant ls greater than unity and
since that positive real root is less than unity, the square of that
modulus is greater than unity, so does the moduius itseif. Therefore, in
elther case the stationary equilibriura is a saddlepoint.
                   k XXx   If {v"+Bu'r'+r u"[B(1+r )-1]}r -v"{P r'-(1-e)n7'}=O, then F2(1)=O,
which implles that unity is a root. To examine the remaining two roots,
                                                             -I]:we shall consider the characteristic equation of the matrix [J                                                            2
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        72(#)=pt3-a2st2+al#-ao -- o, (B6)
where a2=-{Bu""+r'E)}-1{u"[1-B(1+r")]+Bu'r'+v"}+2r">o, aliiE{su"(1+r")}-1･
[2u"r"{i-(i+r)}-v"{p"er'-a-e)m'}]+(r'")2>o, and ao=-{Bu""+r')} i[r{ rX-
        ut x(1-B(1+r ))-(Su'r'+v")}+v"{P r'-(1--e)m'}].
      By assumption, aoutO so (B6) reduces to
        fF2(s.t)=si2-a2"2+al= o. (B7)
Denote the two roots of (B7) as ii2 atd II3. From the relation between the
roots and coefficieRts of (B7), we see that il2+g3=a2>O and P[2Pi3"al>O･
These facts imply that the two roots o£ (B7) have positive real parts;
hence, the two roots of (B7) and thus of (B2) exceed unity in modulus, so
that the only stable root is unity. As a coRsequence, the capital stock
stays at any initial point; that ls, any initial value ef the capital
stock and the associated price of Iand are a stable equilibrium.
                                   ..x *x*   OR the other hand, if {v"+Bu'r'+r u"[B(1+r )-1]}r -v"{P r'-(1--e)m'}
>e, the statlonary equilibrlum is compietely unstable. To prove thls, we
shali make use of the following theorem which is an application of the
Routh theorem to our special case:
Theorem 1: The number of roots of the polynomial in (B6) with positive
real parts is equal to the number of varlations of sign in the scheme
                1, -a2, al+(ao/a2), -ao･
     Since ao is positive due to the assumption, there are three changes
of sign in the scherne stated ln Theoreta 1, which indicates that all the
three roets of (B6) have positive real parts (hence, at least one root is
real and positive). From the construction of (B6) the three roots of (B2)
are greater than unity iR modulus.
Appendix C
    Suppose that the land rent tax ls increased in period O. Slnce the
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dynamic system (BD has one stable and two unstabie roots provided that
             "F X "ti -E{v"+8u'r'+u"r [S(1+r )-ll}r -v"{P r'-U-e)m'}<O and slnce the unstable
roots are eliminated by invoking the transversaHty condition, the
solutions for c, k, and P must be of the form:
       ct= (c(O) - c")gi + c',
                 xt '}       kt= (ko -k )pt1 "k,
       Pt= (p(o) - p')gl + pX,
where ko is the capital stock in period O and l21 is the stable root
(i.e., O<pt1<1). Omitting details, the initial jumps in P(O) and c(O)
requlred to ensure that P and c follow the stable path are given by the
expresslons:
               xx bec(O) =c +(1+r -gl)(ko -k ), (Cl)
              * ee       P(O)=P+ip(ko -k ), (C2)
where ¢EE{Pr'-Q-e)m'}#1{gl-(1"r)}-1>O. DifferentiatiRg (Cl) and (C2) wtth
respect to e, respectively, yields     ,                   s xx     gg{o).gg.(i..'-op{-gg}.(-i+g,)gg<o, (c3)
                   * "e "e        gg(o)-gg+¢{- gg}<o, if gg <o, (,,)
                   X )E X    ddPe(O)" ddPe "ip{- ddks}IO, lf ddPe >O, {C5)
            -x' * xRotlng that c =f(k ) and dl< /de>O.
Appendix D
     Similarly, we have the following Ilnear approximatlon of (3),
                                                 --e k X(10), and (20) around the stationary equilibrium (c, k, P ):
27
          [Ct+1-C" Ct- C'}
          Ikt.1-k" =[J3] kt- k're , (Dl)
          I          [iPt+1-P'rej lpt-pX
where
         1+(u")-IBu'{r'(1-T')-(1+r')T"}
                     -1 [J3] ma -{p'r'+(i-e)m'}
          (-u")-if3u'{r'a-T')-(i+rX)T"}(i+r") (u")-iBu'a+r")T"
                           *                        1+r O .                    ee * x           {P r'-(1-e)m'}(1+r ) 1+r
The characteristic equation of the matrfux [J3] is
   F3(si) " ii3 - B+(u")-IBu'{r' ft-T')-"+rX)T"}+2(1+rX)]s.t2 +
    [2"+rX)+(1+rX)(u")-IBu'[{r'(1--u')-"+rX)'t"}+T"{P"r'-G-e)m'}]+
    (1+r-)2]i2 -(1+r")2= o. (D2)
    Similarly, we have
                s2   F3(O) =- (1+r )< O, and
                                      s* ee F3{1) : (tt")-lt3u'[{r'(1-T')-(1+r')T"}r +(1+r )'t"{P r'-(1-e)n?'}]>O,
there is at least one real root in the interval (O,1). By applying the
same argument as iR appendix B, it follows that the remalning two roots
are greater than unity in modulus so that the stationary equilibrium is a
saddiepoint.
FootRotes
1.According to Fane(1984), a fully compensated tax is deflned as one that
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the government issues perpetual bonds at the same time as it ievied the
tax, uses the proceeds of the bonds to pay the interest on the bonds, and
uses the proceeds of the bonds to make lump-sum transfers to the owners
of land at the time the tax was introduced. To keep the analysis
paraBeling CKR's, I do not follow his fuZly compensated tax.
2.Allowing for positive pepulatioR growth, the long-run equilibrium may
not be well defined because the marginal products of cap2tal, labor, and
}and may be changing through time.
3.AXerRatively, if m'<O is assumed, then w'>O due to both the
homogeneity of F and r'<O, which may lead to different comparative
statics results. However, we shail not conduct this exercise here, for
most of the literature has adopted the assumption we rnade.4.This assumption may not be restri'ctive. To show this, we borrow the
foHowing expianation made by Bernheim agsg). Let <6¥,69,Bt>:--o be a
dyRastic equnibrium if it maximizes the utnity function z:].oBtu(cll,c7)
suipject to cl+(1+rt+1)-1(c9+bt+1)=bt+wt and the noRnegative constraints,
cil,c9,bt+1itO for all t, where c¥ and c? are consumption when young and
oid of generation t, respectiveiy. in a dynastic equiiibrium <811,69>
maximizes Lt(c¥,c9) subject to c¥+a+rt)-ic[l: c"¥--"+rt)-i6{l for each t.
This can be rewritteR as V(Ct)=maxc )c zo u{ct,(1+rt)(Ct-ct)) for each t,
                                  ttwhere ct=cll+(i+rt}riic?. using this functioR, we set up the fonowing
probiem:
      max<c b >co z[e.oBty(ct),
           t'     t+1 t=o
                         -1      subject to Ct+(1+rt) bt+1=wt+bt and Ct, btZO･
                                          AA                      coThe solution of this problem, denoted by <Ct,bt>t.o, corresponds exactly
to the dynastic equilibrium defined above. The inciusion of an additional
choice of the llfe-cycle pattern of coRsumption for any individual would
add clutter without altering any of the central implications of the
present paper. See also Weii (1987) in which a dynastic decision with a
separable utility function is decomposed into dlstinct inter-
generational and iRtrageneratloRal decisions in a slightly different way.
5.The altruistlc overlapping generations economy continues to have well-
defined dynastic equillbria eveR if t3>1, that is, if the rate of time
preference, B -1, is Regative. If this is a case, such dynastic
equilibria in this economy may not be equivalent to the solutlons of the
corresponding optimal growth model.
6.More precisely, the absence of such a' transfer would lead to a zero
capitai stock, aRd hence no output (i.e.,no consumption) for thls
economy. This gives rise to unbourided marginal utMity of consumption.
7.It should be noted that the fixed supply of labor is not necessary to
yield our result. Allowing an endogenous leisure/labor choice, a
generation t consumer is to maximize the utHity functioR Wt=u(ct,nt)+
BWt.1 subject to ct+bt+1rr(1+rt)bt+;vtnt+zt and given bt, where nt stands
for enciogenous labor supply. Even though the rental rate, the wage rate,
and the rent on land all depend on the capital stock as weil as labor
supply, the first-order conditions for utillty maximlzation (6a) and (6b)
are Rot basically changed, and there will be one additional equation that
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says that the margiRal rate of substitution between labor and consumption
equais the wage xate. The stationary equilibrium conditions are given by
      B[1+r(k ,n )] = 1,          -E"e x"in rkx    u (c ,n )/u (c ,n )=w(k ,n ),       nc         Nee ee      f(k ,n }=c,         xx k･K-e   r(k ,n ) = (1-S)m(  ,n )/P ,
where u. (J'--c,n) represents partial derivat±ves. The first three        jequations together determine the statioRary-state levels of capital,
consumption, and labor suppiy independentiy of the last equation. }{ence,      ee *both k and n are unaffected by changes in either P or e, so we once
again obtain (13). Namely, the RCP will prevail regardless of whether
labor supply may or may not be a choice variable.
8.Even with the slighUy general utiUty functioR:
              ;-xtrcu(ct,bt.1) + B;vrt.1,
we can establish simUar comparative statics results as izt (18) although
additional restrictions on the utllity function are needed. However, if
preferences are recursive with bequests in utility, that is,
Yt=U(Ct,bt",Yt+1), the analysis becornes extrernely complicated.
9.}vlore preciseiy, Chamley and Write (1987) have assumed the property of
"crowdiRg out (CO)" that is sufficient and necessary for the positive
effect on the stationary-state capital stock of the iand rent tax, and
have shown that the Hicksian stability condltion is sufficient for the
property of CO. Note however that the property of CO is neither
sufficient nor necessary for saddlepeint stability in their model.
10.To show this, we shall use the model given in footnote 7, except th3t
the budget equation is replaced by ct+bt+1=(1+rt)bt+;vtnt-T(;Vtnt)+Zt,
where T is regarded as a non2inear labor income tax (OsT'<1 and 'r")O) and
zi=emt+T("rtnt). In the stationary equilibrkum, we have
          Nx ee )} sie"t, rk*x  u (f(k ),n )/u (f(k ),n )=gv(k ,n )[1-V(vv (k ,n )n )],
and the other conditlons are ideRticai to those in footnote 7. It is
immediately seen that the stationary-state levels of capital aRd iabor
supply are determined by the condition above together with the modified
golden-rule condition lndependently of the non-arbitrage conditioR
between capitai and land, so that those real variabies are unaffected by
changes in P and thus in e.
11.To show this, consider the same probiem confronting a generation t
consumer as in section 2, except that the budget equation is replaced by
Ct+bt+"Xtur(1+rt)bt+h(xt-1);vt+zt, where xt is human capital investment
and h(.) is the stock of human capital that is a function of xt. Some
manipulation of the resulting first-order necessary conditioRs yields
(11) and
       Bh'(xt);v(kt.1)u'(ct.?=u'(ct).
Hence, the stationary equilibrium is characterlzed by (12a), (12b),
(12c), and
           x pt      Bh'(x );v(k )=1,
the Iast equation determines the optimal level of human capital lnvestment,       x tegiven k. The levei of k is determined solely by "2a), so that the
30
stationary-state capital stock is still unaffe¢ted by changes in the landrent tax; consequentiy the RCP follows.
References
Abel,A.B., 1986, The failure of Ricardian equivaience under progressive
   wealth taxatlon, Journal of Pub!ic Economics 30, 117-128.
Abel,A.B., 1985, Precautionary savings and accidental bequests, American
   Economic Revie;v 75, 777-791.
Andreoni,J.,1989, Giving with impure altruism: Appllcations to charity
   and RicardiaR equivalence, Journal of Politlca2 Economy 97, 1447-14S8.
Barro,R.J,1974, Are government bonds net wealth?, Journa2 of Po2itical
   Economy 82,1095-1117.
Barro,R.J.and G.S.Becker, 1989, Fertility choice iR a model of economlc
   growth, Econometrica S7, 481-501.
Barsky,R.B.,N.G.}vtankiw, and S.P.Zeldes, 1986, Ricardian consumers with
   KeyResian propensities, American Economic Reviegf 76, 676-691.
Bernheim,B.D.,A.Shlelfer and L.Summers, 1985, The strategic bequest
   motive, Journal of Po2itical Economy 93, 1045-1076.
Bernheim,B.D.,1989, IntergeneratioRal altruism, dynastic equillbria and
   social welfare, Review of Economic Studies 56, 119-128.
Calvo,G.,Kotlikoff,L.J.,and C.A.,Rodriguez,1979, The iRcidence of a tax
   on pure rent: A new (?) reason for an old answer, Journal of Politica2
   Economy 87, 869-874.
Chamley,C.and B.D.Wright, 1987, Fiscal incidence iR an overlappiRg
   generations model with a fixed asset, vrournal of Public Economics 32,
   3-24.
Eaton,J., 1988, Foreign owned land, American Economic Revievsr 78, 76-88.
Epstein,L.G., and J.A.Hynes, 1983, The rate of time preference aRd
   dynamic economic anaiysis, Journa2 of Po12tical Economy 91, 611-635.
Fane, G., 1984, The incidence of a tax on pure rent: The old reason for
   the old answer, Journal of Politica2 Economy 92, 329-333.
Feldstein, b<.,1977, The surprising iRcidence of a tax on pure rent:A new
   aitswer to an old questioR, Journa2 of Political Economy 85, 348-360.
Feldstein, M.,1988, Effects of fiscal policies when lncornes are
   uncertain: A contradiction to Ricardlan equivalence, American Economic
   Review 78 14-23.            'Hubbard,R.G. and }l.Judd, 1986, Liquldity constraints, fiscal Poiicy, and
   consumptioR, Brookings Papers REcon. Activity 1, 1-50.
Ihori,T., 1990, Economic effects of iand taxes in an inflationary
  econorny, Journal of Public Economics 42, 195-211.
Kotlikoff,J.aRd L.H.,Summers, 1981, The role of intergenerational
  transfers iR aggregate capital ac¢umulation, Journal of Po2itica2  Economy 89, 706-732.
Weil, P.,1987, Love thy children: Reflection of the Barro debt neutrality
  theorem, Journa2 of Monetary Economics 19, 377-391.
31
i'
?
i'1
              l
              l
------r---------!--------------1 -------              i
              i
              l
13-i -1- 13-i(v'ltt')
i
l
l
"(k)
0 ko - ki k
Figure1. Whenthelong-runsupply curveof
capital is less steeper than that of the long-run
demand curve of capital, an increase in the lafid
rent tax raises the long-run capital stock but lowers
the long-run price of land.
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Figure2. Whenthelong-runsupplycurveof
capital is steeper than that of the long-run demand
curve ofcapital, an increase in the land rent tax
raises the long-run capital stock and the long-run
price of land.
r?
rq - ,-i)- fi
fi-i -1
i
l
E
t
l
{
?
l
l
:
0 k
Figure3. AniRcreaseinthelandrenttaxraises
the long-run capital stock but lowers the long-ruR
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Figure 4. When the slope of the long-run demand
curve of capital is smaller than that of the leng-run
supply curve of capital, an increase iR the land rent
tax raises the leng-run capital stock but loweres the
long-run price of land.
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Figure 5. When the slope of the long-run demand
curve of capital is greater than that of the long-run
curve of capital, an increase in the land reRt tax
raises the long-run capital stock aRd the long-run
price ofland.
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